This paper presents an empirical analysis of two models of non-voting which Ordeshook and I incorporated into the spatial theory of electoral competition. 1 We called these models abstention from alienation and abstention from indifference since our goal was to formalize established socialpsychological hypotheses of non-voting. ~ The data used in this paper is part of the 1968 election survey conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center.
Introduction
This paper presents an empirical analysis of two models of non-voting which Ordeshook and I incorporated into the spatial theory of electoral competition. 1 We called these models abstention from alienation and abstention from indifference since our goal was to formalize established socialpsychological hypotheses of non-voting. ~ The data used in this paper is part of the 1968 election survey conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center.
Spatial theory of electoral competition originated with Downs and Black) Their one dimensional models were generalized by Davis and I-llnich. 4 A detailed exposition of spatial theory is given in Chapters 11 and 12 of Riker and Ordeshook. s l_~,t me give a brief review of the basic spatial voting model for a two candidate election where all citizens in the electorate evaluate the candidates in terms of a common set of n basic issues. Assume that every potential voter perceives the candidates as points .01 and ~2 in an n-dimensional Euclidean space whose dimensions are these basic issues.
The dimensions are described as salient political issues in previous expositions of the theory, but it is more consistent with empirical studies of voter attitudes to conceive of the dimensions as heuristic factors which are used by a voter to forecast a candidate's behavior with respect to economic and social policy once elected to office. 6 We should expect a voter to simplify the evaluation process by reducing the complexity of the issue space. Since the choice is over representatives and not issues per se, a policy oriented *Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Biacksburg, Virginia. I wish to thank my graduate assistant, Mr. Thomas Southworth, for assisting me in this research. I also wish to thank Dr. Larry Cahoon for his outstanding insights, patience, and hard work during the years of development of our statistical methodology.
voter must forecast how a candidate will behave in office. It is reasonable to use past performance and past associations as a guide to a candidate's future behavior. Moreover most voters do not have much incentive to invest in information, given the small impact of a single vote and the infrequency of elections. Thus it is rational for voters to use simple rules of thumb based on inexpensive but noisy information to evaluate and choose among competing candidates.
Let us concentrate on the mth citizen in the electorate (m = 1 .... ,M). Assume there exists a unique point ~Xm in the space whose coordinates are citizen m's most preferred positions on the basic issues. This point, called the ideal point, is the position for citizen m's ideal candidate. For any other point .01 assume that the mth citizen's utility function, denoted u(X~m, 0.), is a monotonically decreasing function of the weighted Euclidean distance: 
If the inequality is reversed, citizen m votes for candidate two.
Abstention models
The two abstention models, originally d&med in terms of a vote/abstain dichotomous choice rule, were combined into a general probabilistic voting model by Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook. s I will now define them separately in terms of probabilistic choice functions of the utility function u(.xm,.0).
Abstention from indtfference
The probability that the mth citizen votes for the closest candidate to his ideal point is a monotonically increasing function of the absolute difference in utilities:
In order to relate this model with the 'spatial voting rule given by (2), assume that if citizen m decides to vote when DUm = 0, he votes for candi-1 date one with probability 7" This model implies that in a random sample of the electorate, citizens with large D U's are more likely to vote than citizens with small D U's. 9
Abstention from alienation
The probability that the mth citizen votes for his closest candidate is a monotonically increasing function of the maximum utility for the candidates:
Given a random sample of the electorate, citizens with large MU's are more likely to vote than citizens with small MU's. One variant of these abstention models which will be discussed later holds . . ll_0-.x llA.
when U(Xm, O) is approximately linear in -
In this case, expression (3)in the definition of indifference can be replaced by the absolute difference in distance, namely:
For the spatial variant, the probability that the ruth citizen votes for his closest candidate is a monotonically decreasing function of the minimum distance:
I will now discuss a simple test of these models using "feeling thermometer" scores from the 1968 SRC election survey.
Feding thermometer scores
The individuals interviewed in the 1968 survey were a representative crosssection of voting age citizens living in private households in the continental U.S. The twelve largest metropolitan areas of the country were chosen with certainty.
Interviewing was conducted in two waves. For the first or pre-election wave, the interviewing started in the month of September and continued through the first four days in November. The post-election interviewing began immediately after election day and ended in the latter days of February, 1969. The overall response rate for the pre-election survey was 86.3%. To compensate for an unexpectedly low post-election response rate, a two-page mail questionnaire, inquiring about the 1968 voting behavior, was sent out to 182 post-election non-interviewees for whom a mailing address was available. This mailing, and a subsequent one, brought responses c choice from 36 of the original non-interviewees, thereby increasing the overall post election response rate to 88.5%.
The question used in this analysis concerns the feeling which the respondents held towards twelve major political figures, including Humphrey, Nixon, and their running mates. This question was asked in the post-election wave. The respondents were told to use a score of 100 ° to indicate a very warm or favorable feeling for the politician. In contrast, a score of 0 ° was to indicate a very cold or unfavorable feeling for th~ politician. A response of 50 ° was specified to mean "No feeling at all for the politician." An inspection of the distribution of scores in the sample suggested that many respondents were using a 50 ° response when they did not know much about a politician. Presumably these respondents were unwilling to take the initiative and admit their ignorance, lo
Let Tim denote the ruth respondent's score of the jth politician. Let me make the critical assumptions that a) the maximum of TNm and THra for each respondent is proportional to the maximum utility of MUm, and b) that the absolute difference in thermometer scores for Nixon and Humphrey, I ZNm -THIn l, is proportional to DUm for these two candidates. These assumptions seem reasonable for respondents who have moderate preferences for or against Nixon and Humphrey. The assumptions are questionable for respondents who give 0 ° or 100 ° to one or both of the candidates. It is impossible to determine the intensity of negative feelings toward a candidate indicated by a 0 ° score. The finiteness of the range of scores distorts the utility response in an unknown manner. Since there is no common unit for utilities, moreover, the mapping of utility to thermometer scores is idiosyncratic. The proportionality constants for the relationships between thermometer scores and the abstention models vary among respondents.
There are other problems with the assumptions connecting thermometer scores with utilities. As was previously mentioned, there seems to be a confounding of 50 ° scores with "don't knows." Some respondents might give non 50 ° scores on some random basis to politicians in the party which is not their preferred party. In addition, some respondents may be unwilling to express their true preferences for political figures they are cognizant of. 11
The next section presents an analysis of the abstention models using the thermometer scores. The data is consistent with the existence of both .types of abstention models, assuming the relationship between the thermometer scores and utilities as stated above. After the first data results are presented, I will discuss the causal relations between the models and the data in light of the assumptions.
3. Analysis of thermometer scores I tabulated the thermometer scores for the 1391 respondents out of the post-election sample of 1481 who gave scores to both Nixon and Humphrey.
There were 920 respondents who stated they voted for either Nixon or Humphrey.
The Wallace voters, however, posed a tactical problem for testing the abstention models. It is hard to believe that'many Wallace voters expected Wallace to win, or even expected that Wallace would receive enough electoral voters to have a significant impact on s0cial.policy. Given the nature of the 1968 campaign, it seems reasonable to assume that Wallace voters did not vote strategically. In light of these assumptions, two def'mitions of abstention were used. In one, the 211 respondents who stated they voted for Wallace or said they would have had they voted were classified as nonvoters. In a second classification, these respondents were excluded. The means and standard deviations of T2vmo THIn, I TNrn -T~Cm I, and the maximum of the pair {TNm, T n m ) are displayed in Table 1.1~ Since DUn, = I TNrn -Tim I by assumption, it follows that the mean absolute difference in thermometer scores should be lower for non-voters than for voters if the indifference hypothesis holds. Similarly, if the alienation hypothesis holds, the mean maximum score should be lower for nonvoters than for voters. Table 2 presents the t-values, degrees-of-freedom, and P values for two sample t tests of differences in the means of voters and non-voters using the Welch treatment of the Bahrens-Fisher problem. 1~ The results for the case with Wallace voters defined as non-voters support the cross-tabulation findings of Page and Brody. 14 Both the abstention from indifference and alienation effects are significant at the 0.05 level. When the Wallace voters are excluded, however, the differences in the means have the "correct" sign, but they are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The Wallace voters gave much lower scores on average to Nixon and Humprey than the rest of the sample. The correlation coefficient between max T m and I T~vm -Trim [ in the whole sample is 0.43. The correlation coefficient is 0.42 for the Humphrey-Nixon voters.
The results show a statistical relationship between the thermometer scores and non-voting. Provided that most respondents revealed their issue oriented preferences in their scores, the results support the non-voting models presented above. But there is another plausible explanation of the results. It might have been the case that respondents who did not vote gave equal scores to Humprey and Nixon, and Wallace voters gave them low scores In other ~vords, respondents who never vote or who are ignorant about politics give either equal scores to the major candidates, or they give them low scores. These competing models can be resolved by a panel study over several elections, but a partial resolution can be obtained by analyzing a subsample of the 1968 respondents. The next section presents an analysis of a specially selected subsample of 756 respondents.
A subsample analysis
Assume that re.spondents who (1) do not score all twelve politicians, or (2) who give a score of 50 ° to four or more politicians, tend to be politically ignorant or apathetic. These respondents were removed from the sample. Another group of ten respondents were removed because they did not reveal their voting decision. Table 3 shows the difference between the total and subsample income and education distributions, and also gives a breakdown of reported voting statistics for the two groups. The subsample has higher incomeand education than does the whole sample, and contains fewer non-voters. From the remaining 756 respondents two groups were analyzed. The first group consisted of those respondents who identified themselves as strong Democrats, weak Democrats, or Independents who leaned toward the Democrats. This latter group was included since a review of the data indicated that their preferences were strongly Democratic. The second group were those respondents who identified themselves as strong Republicans, weak Republicans, or Independents who leaned toward the Republicans (see Table 4 ).
The t statistics for the differences in means using the subsample scores are shown on the bottom part of These tests only make use of three basic assumptions: 1) Max Ten is proportional to MUm for each m, 2) I TAr m -THin I is proportional to DUn, and 3) the decision to vote depends on the utilities in the form described in Section 1. No use has been made of the spatial model. I will present an analysis using the spatial model of utility. 
Using the spatial model
The scores which a respondent gave to the other candidates such as Johnson, Muskie, Reagan, etc. contain information about the ideal points of the respondents. The whole set of scores also can be used to estimate the positions of the candidates in a political space, under certain assumptions about common voter perceptions and issue weights. Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook have developed a technique to "map" ideal points and candidate positions using a parametric spatial model, ms The CHO techniciue is based on the following spatial model for the thermometer scores. Recalling the def'mition of weighted Euclidean distance (1), assume that the mth respondent's thermometer score for politician ] takes the form:
where elm is a stochastic error term, and at least one of the n dimensions is a valence issue. 16 Citizens may define the space with a particular sensitivity to positions that are "far" from their ideal points or alternatively they may be sensitive, i.e., perceive differences as substantively meaningful, only if positions are "near" their ideal points. To accommodate, the several possibilities, the exponent r is allowed to vary. If r = 2, citizen rn is more sensitive to positions that are far from ~x,n. If r = 1, the sensitivity is uniform. Ifr = 1/2, citizens are more cognizant of differences near their ideal points. For a given population, r is a parameter that either must be estimated in terms of goodness-of-fit, or is preselected.
Assuming that the thermometer score is given by (5) for each respondent, the CHO goal is to identify the dimensionality of the issue space, n, each politician's position in the space, ~0i, each citizen's ideal point, ~Xm, and the matrix of issue weights, A. The CHO method, in a nutshell, transforms the covariance matrix of thermometer scores and applies the principal components version of factor analysis (see Appendix). The covariance matrix must be modified since a factor analysis is appropriate only if Tim is a linear function of Xm, whereas from (5) it is clear that Tim has a non-linear term ~xr~_Ax~r n . In ~ addition to the spatial model itself, the .basic assumptions underlying the method are: (1) all respondents have the same perception of each candidate; (2) ai(m ) is independent of rn for each i, that is, all respondents weight the issues in an identical fashion; and (3) the ideal points in the sample have considerable variation. The first two assumptions, while implicit in metric scaling techniques and while possessing a long history in spatial analysis, are restrictive. Without the assumption of some structure, however, estimation is impossible.
As a partial resolution of the problem the Democratic and Republican party identifiers were analyzed separately. These groups are sufficiently homogeneous with respect to perceptions and issue weights to make assumptions 1 and 2 reasonable, but have considerable dispersion of ideal points. The CHO technique cannot be used for groups, such as the Blacks, whose thermometer scores have little variation in the orderings 0f~the politicians.
The feeling thermometer scores from each group were used by CHO to estimate a joint space containing politicians and respondents. As is discussed in detail in the cited working paper, the data supports an assumption that the space is two-dimensional (with a third valence dimension for the less well-known politicians). The best fit for the exponent r is obtained for r= 1/2.
The estimated thermometer score for Nixon given by the ruth respondent is:
where ~1 and ~2 are the estimated salience weights, ~NI mad ~N2 are the estimates of Nixon's position coordinates, and ~m I and ~m 2 are the estimated,ideal point coordinates. The scores for extremists can be less than 0
since ZNm is not constrained to be non-negative. ~The estimated thermometer score for Humphrey is the same as (6) with 0nl and ~n2 instead of ~N1 and ~N2-The average correlation between computed scores and the raw thermometer scores is about 0.38. The weights ~ i and $2, although not constrained to be positive, were positive for the two groups. This result provides strong support for the spatial model of the scores.
There are no significant differences in the candidate maps for the three groups. The major differences among the estimated parameters between the groups were in the mean ideal points and the issue weights. For example, ~/fil = 1.74 for the Republicans and ~:/fil = 5,43 for the Democrats, and the magnitude of the valence issue of the Democrats was 2/3 of the magnitude for the Republicans. These results are discussed in detail in the cited working paper. The results are sufficiently positive to support, the use of candidate-ideal point map to test the non-voting models for the subsample.
The estimated ideal points for the Republican identifiers and non-voters are shown in Figures 1 and 2 , where the coordinates have been adjusted by the salience weights so that any distance between points in these figures is simple Euclidean distance. As a consequence, all the ideal points which are closer to Nixon in Figure 1 should prefer Nixon to Humphrey and vice-versa. For Republican identifiers who stated they voted, such a decision rule gave Note. *Mean denotes average ideal point for Republicans.
95.9% correct predictions using a bias correction discussed by CHO. It was not possible to map Wallace in the space since Wallace received a zero score from about 43% of the sub-sample. These zero swamped the sample covariance between positive Wallace scores and other candidate scores, causing Wallace (and LeMay) to be placed by the procedure on a separate dimension. If respondents were allowed to give negative scores, we might have been able to place these two candidates at the extreme position where we subjectively felt them to be located.
These spatial maps of Republican and Democratic party identifiers can be used to test the spatial variant of the abstention models. The statistics for DD m and MinDm, as defined by expressions (3a) and (4a) are given in Table 5 . The alienation effect for these voters seen in Table 2 is lost in the spatial data. When the Wallace voters are excluded, the two sample t statistic is significant at the 0.05 level for the indifference model. The alienation model is rejected for the Republican subsample. For the Democratic subsample, the indifference model is rejected. It appears that the Democratic Wallace voters exhibit the alienation effect. When they are excluded, the difference between the mean of MinD,n for voters and non-voters has the correct sign for alienation, but the t value is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These results are consistent with the Democratic thermometer results given in Table 2 .
There is some confounding between the two models. When DD m = O, ~x m lies on the line which bisects the line segment connecting _0N and ,OH. An individual whose ideal point lies near either extreme of this bisecting line has a small DDrn and a large MinDm. Thus one cannot distinguish between the models for individuals at the extreme of the bisector, but there are relatively few such respondents in those regions for the two subsamples.
Conclusion
The results viewed as a whole support the hypothesis that the alienation and indifference effects are present in the population. The Wallace voters seem to be an alienated group, especially for the Democrats. The indifference model is supported by the data from the Republican sample, but not for the Democrats.
The spatial results presented in this paper provide a first step in the process of testing the spatial model of voting. An analysis of the 1972 and 1976 election surveys should provide more support for spatial theory.
Appendix
Suppose that M respondents give thermometer scores Tim to p ÷ 1 political figures whom I will call candidates for sake of a better label. Thus the data set is an M X (p + 1) array. The estimation procedure begins by transforming this array into one whose entries are linear in 0 i and xm. This is done by raising the scores to the rth power and then subtracting~he en~tries for the p + 1st candidate from the other p. In order to simplify the exposition, I will present the methodology for the case when r = 1, and for a two dimensional mapping (n = 2).
Before going into the details of the statistical method, let me try to clarify the treatment of the valence issue. Suppose there is a third dimension, such as candidate honesty or executive ability, for which all citizens have identical ideal points. With no loss of generality let this ideal point be zero. It is impossible to use the scores to estimate the candidate positions 0]3 when there is no variation in the ideal positions on this dimension. As a consequence, the 0i3 positions must be chosen by the data analyst.
In our analysis of the 1968 survey, we decided that the average respondent knew more about Johnson, Nixon, R. Kennedy and Humphrey than the others, especially McCarthy and Romney. We grouped Robert Kennedy with the other three because we believed that many respondents scored him as if he were JFK (RFK was killed five months before the survey). We grouped Rockefeller and Reagan with the lesser known figures on the premise that they lacked national stature although they had strong regional reputations. The Republican results were unaltered when we grouped Rockefeller with J, N, K, and H. Given our subdivision, we set #/3 = 0 for J, N, K, and H and 0/3 = 1 for the rest. The dimension weight a 3 was estimated for each group, yielding #3/~1 = 0.39 for the Democrats and 0.79 for the Republicans.
Returning to the statistical model, suppose we reorder the candidates so that 0p+ 1, 3 
Since there are no natural units for the underlying dimensions, it is impossible to use this data base to estimate both A and ~ separately. The method estimates .4 ~.4 and the ofientafion of the ~oordinate system under the assumption that,4 ~`4 is diagonal.
If not, the method rotates the coordinate system to match the eigenvectors ofA ~A. In the special case when .4 ~.4 is a scalar times the identity, the covariance matrix of the Yjm is invariant under rotation. In order to estimate the components of A, assume that ~ is the identity matrix. This is not a bad working assumption given our lack of evidence about the distribution of the ideal points.
The covariance matrix (A5) can be rewritten as ACA' + ~, where A is the px3 matrix (20..', ~1), and C is the 3 × 3 diagonal matrix:
The sample covafiance matrix of the Y/m is then factored to give an estimate of AC½p where F is a 3 X 3 unknown orthogonal rotation. A factor of the sample covariance yields an estimate of ~ as well as of AC½I ~, The next step is to estimate the rotation P and the matrix C by least squares fits. To 
The fkst least squ~es fit estimates F~ and F~ by util~g our knowledge that the ~kd column of the ma~ix A is the vector 1. This w~ simultaneously provide an estimate of c. The second fit estimates A and F s by us~g the D} -Dp~ 1 as the dependent v~iable values.
To cons~uct the f~st least squ~es fit, note that:
where I~ transforms the matrix AC ½ but leaves the third column unchanged. Next I~2 acts on AC½F s in a similar way, leaving the second column unchanged, and simi-larly for P,. Thus since the third column of AC ½ is lc ½, we also know the third column of AC½P= is lc ½. If we post-multiply our estir~aate of AC½p by P, 'P5 ', we obtain an estimate of/~C½ P3, the third column of which is ~lc ~A. Since: 
LSin 83 cos 83
This estimate will now be used to estimate R and A. Recalling provided a, ~ a0 and 6 ~ 0 or ~n/2. These cams ~e.covered by perform~g two tests immediately after the regression has been run, v~., the tests for az = 0 and for ~, = ~o • The coord~ates of the mean ide~ po~t (x,, x:) are estimated by comb~ing ~a and ~, with the estimates of ~, a,, and a= found from (A16).
